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Abstract. Adversarial noises are useful tools to probe the weakness of
deep learning based computer vision algorithms. In this paper, we de-
scribe a robust adversarial perturbation (R-AP) method to attack deep
proposal-based object detectors and instance segmentation algorithms.
Our method focuses on attacking the common component in these algo-
rithms, namely Region Proposal Network (RPN), to universally degrade
their performance in a black-box fashion. To do so, we design a loss func-
tion that combines a label loss and a novel shape loss, and optimize it
with respect to image using a gradient based iterative algorithm. Evalu-
ations are performed on the MS COCO 2014 dataset for the adversarial
attacking of 6 state-of-the-art object detectors and 2 instance segmen-
tation algorithms. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of the
proposed method.
1 Introduction
Deep learning based algorithms achieve superior performance in many problems
in computer vision, including image classification, object detection and segmen-
tation. However, it has been recently shown that algorithms based on Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN) are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which
are intentionally crafted noises that are imperceptible to human observer, but
can lead to large errors in the deep network models when added to images. To
date, most existing adversarial perturbations are designed to attack CNN image
classifiers, e.g, [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8].
Recently, attention has been shifted to finding effective adversarial pertur-
bation to CNN-based object detectors [9,10]. Compared to image classification,
finding effective perturbations for object detectors is more challenging, as the
perturbation should affect not just the class label, but also the location and size
of each object within the image. Existing methods [9,10] mostly design specific
loss functions based on the final prediction to disturb object class labels. As
such, these methods are model dependent, which require detailed knowledge of
the network architectures.
In this work, we develop a Robust Adversarial Perturbation (R-AP) method
to universally attack deep proposal-based models that are fundamental to ma-
jority of object detectors and instance segmentation algorithms. Our method is
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Fig. 1. Overview of the Robust Adversarial Perturbation (R-AP) method. Our method
attacks Region Proposal Network (RPN) [11] in deep proposal-based object detectors
and instance segmentation algorithms.
based on the fact that a majority of recent object detectors and instance seg-
mentation algorithms, e.g, [12,11,13,14] use a Region Proposal Network (RPN)
[11] to extract object-like regions, known as proposals, from an image and then
process the proposals further to obtain object class labels and bounding boxes
in object detection, and the instance class labels and region masks in instance
segmentation. If a RPN is successfully attacked by an adversarial perturbation,
such that no correct proposals generated, the subsequent process in the object
detection or instance segmentation pipeline will be affected. Figure 1 overviews
the proposed R-AP method. The investigation of adversarial perturbation on
deep proposal-based models can lead to further understanding of the vulner-
abilities of these widely applied methods. The efforts can also aid improving
the reliability and safety of the derived technologies, including computer vision
guided autonomous cars and visual analytics.
The proposed R-AP method attacks a RPN based on the optimization of
two loss functions: (i) the label loss and (ii) the shape loss, each of which targets
a specific aspect of RPN. First, inspired by recent methods [9,10] that attacks
CNN-based object detectors, we design the label loss to disturb the label predic-
tion (which indicates whether a proposal represents an object or not). Second,
we also design a shape loss, which attacks the shape regression step in RPN, so
that even if an object is correctly identified, the bounding box cannot be accu-
rately refined to the object shape. Note that our R-AP method can be combined
with existing adversarial perturbation method such as [9] to jointly attack cor-
responding network, since R-AP specifically focuses on attacking RPN, which
is the intermediate stage of network compared to others which target the entire
network.
Experimental validations are performed on the MS COCO 2014 [15], the cur-
rent largest dataset used for training and evaluating mainstream object detectors
and instance segmentation algorithms. Our experimental results demonstrate
that the proposed R-AP attack can significantly degrade the performance of
several state-of-the-art object detectors and instance segmentation algorithms,
with minimal perceptible artifacts to human observers.
Our contributions are summarized in the following:
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– To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to thoroughly investigate
the effects of adversarial perturbation on RPN, which universally affects the
performance of deep proposal-based object detectors and instance segmen-
tation algorithms.
– In contrast to previous attack paradigms that only disturb object class label
prediction, our method not only disturbs the proposal label prediction in
RPN, but also distracts the shape regression, which can explicitly degrade
the bounding box prediction in proposal generation.
2 Related Work
Deep proposal-based models follow a common paradigm of two steps —
proposal generation and proposal refinement. A majority of recent object de-
tectors and instance segmentation algorithms are deep proposal-based models.
For object detection [11,12], a Region Proposal Network (RPN) generates object
proposals, which are refined in subsequent network modules for the exact bound-
ing boxes and class labels. The state-of-the-art instance segmentation [14,13] can
be viewed as an extended version of object detection, which also use RPN to
generate object proposals and refine them to semantic mask of objects.
Region Proposal Network (RPN) is a CNN-based model for object proposal
generation. A RPN starts with a (manually specified) fixed size of multi-scale
anchor boxes for each cell in feature map. At training phase, each anchor box is
matched to ground truth. If the overlap between an anchor box and a ground
truth is greater than threshold, this anchor box will be marked as positive ex-
ample, otherwise negative example. Moreover, the shape offset between positive
anchor box and the matched ground truth is recored for bounding box shape
regression. At testing phase, the label and offset predictions of all anchor boxes
are generated within a single forward. Compared to the selective search method
[16] used in RCNN [17], RPN is much more efficient and accurate, such that it
is widely used in current deep models to provide proposals.
Adversarial perturbation is an intentionally crafted noise that aims to per-
turb deep learning based models with minimal perception distortion to the im-
age. Many methods [7,2,3,4,5,6,8,1] have been proposed to fool image classifiers.
Szegedy et al [2] first described this intriguing property and formulated adver-
sarial perturbation generation as an optimization problem. Goodfellow et al [3]
proposed an optimal max-norm constrained perturbations, referred as “fast gra-
dient sign method” (FGSM), to improve the running efficiency. Kurakin et al [4]
proposed a “basic iterative method” which generates perturbation iteratively
using FGSM. Papernot et al [5] constructed an adversarial salieny map to indi-
cate the desired places that can be affected efficiently. The DeepFool of Moosavi
et al [6] further improves the effectiveness of adversarial perturbation. Moosavi
et al [8] discovered the existence of image agnostic adversarial perturbations for
image classifier.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of performing R-AP on the object detector Faster-RCNN [11] and
the instance segmentation algorithm FCIS [13]. (c) is the original image. (d) is the
noise generated from R-AP, amplified by a factor of 10 for better visibility. (e) is the
perturbed image by adding (c) and (d). (a,f) are the Faster-RCNN object detection of
(c,e), and (b,g) are the FCIS instance segmentation of (c,e), respectively.
Recently, adversary attack on object detectors has attracted many attentions.
Lu et al [10] attempted to generate adversarial perturbations on “stop” sign and
“face” to mislead corresponding detectors. Xie et al [9] proposed a dense adver-
sarial generation method to iteratively incorrect predictions of object detectors.
However, these methods are task-specific, which designs loss functions based on
the final predictions. They do not address the adversarial perturbation univer-
sally. In contrast, we focus on attacking RPN, a common component of deep
proposal-based models, to universally degrade their performance without know-
ing the details of their architecture.
3 Method
The proposed method attacks deep proposal-based object detectors and instance
segmentation algorithms by adding minimal adversarial noises to the input image
that can effectively disturb the predictions of Region Proposal Network (RPN).
Given an input image and a pre-trained RPN, we design a specific objective
function, a combination of two terms — the label loss and the shape loss, to
calculate the adversarial perturbation. In particular, we optimize this objective
function with respect to image using an iterative gradient based method.
Note all mainstream deep proposal-based object detectors and instance seg-
mentation algorithms rely on a few standard RPNs to provide proposals for sub-
sequent processes. Once the RPN is disturbed, the performance of these deep
models is naturally degraded. As such, our R-AP method is suitable in nature
for black-box attack to these models, i.e, without the need to know their im-
plementation details. Inspired by [9], we generate adversarial perturbations for
different RPN and combine them together to improve the robustness of black-
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box attack. Figure 2 illustrates an example of R-AP attack on object detection
and instance segmentation.
Section 3.1 describes the notations and the general paradigm of label loss
for generating adversarial perturbations. Then we introduce our new shape loss
that can explicitly disturb proposal shape regression. Section 3.2 presents the
details of iterative adversarial perturbation generation scheme.
3.1 Notations and Problem Formulation
Denote I as the input image that contains n ground truth bounding boxes for
objects {b¯i = (x¯i, y¯i, w¯i, h¯i)}ni=1, where x¯i, y¯i, w¯i, h¯i are the x- and y-coordinate
of the box center point, the width and height of bounding box b¯i, respectively.
Let Fθ denote a Region Proposal Network (RPN) with model parameters θ. Let
Fθ(I) = {(sj , bj)}mj=1 denotes the set of m generated proposals with input image
I, where sj denotes the confidence score (probability after sigmoid function) of j-
th proposal and bj is the bounding box of j-th proposal. Let bj = (xj , yj , wj , hj),
where xj , yj , wj , hj are the x- and y-coordinate of the box center point, the width
and height of bounding box bj , respectively.
Our goal is to seek an minimal adversarial perturbation added to image I
to fail a RPN . The adversarial perturbation generation can be casted as an
optimization problem of specific designed loss. In our method, we design the
loss as the summation of (i) the label loss Llabel, which is a general paradigm
used in previous methods to disturb label prediction, and (ii) the shape loss
Lshape, which is our newly proposed term to explicitly disturb bounding box
shape regression. As Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is an approximation of
human perception of image quality, we employ it to evaluate the distortion of
adversarial perturbation. Less perturbation results in higher PSNR. Throughout
this work, we assume the model parameters θ of PRN are fixed, and the R-AP
algorithm generates a perturbed image I by optimizing the following loss as
minI Llabel(I;Fθ) + Lshape(I;Fθ), s.t. PSNR(I) ≥ , (1)
where PSNR(I) denotes the PSNR of luminance channel in image I,  is the
lower bound of PSNR. We describe the label loss Llabel and shape loss Lshape in
sequel.
Label Loss. The label loss Llabel is designed to disrupt the label prediction
of proposals, which is in analogy to existing adversarial perturbation methods
[10,9] for object detectors. Denote zj ∈ {0, 1} as the indicator of j-th proposal,
where zj = 1 means that j-th proposal is positive, otherwise negative. We let
zj = 1 if (1) the bounding box intersect-over-union (IoU) of j-th proposal with
an arbitrary ground truth object is greater than a preset threshold µ1; (2) the
confidence score of j-th proposal is greater than another preset threshold µ2,
otherwise we set zj = 0. The above rule can be formulated as zj = 1, if ∃ i,
IoU(b¯i, bj) > µ1 and sj > µ2, and 0 otherwise.
Note that RPN initially generates a large amount of proposals, and in R-
AP, we only focus on disturbing positive proposals as they are the key to the
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subsequent algorithms. The label loss Llabel is given by
Llabel(I;Fθ) =
∑m
j=1 zj log(sj). (2)
In other words, minimizing this loss is equivalent to decreasing confidence score
of positive proposals.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Perturbation Generation
Require: RPN model Fθ; input image I; maximal iteration number T .
1: I0 = I, t = 0;
2: while t < T and
∑m
j=1 zj 6= 0 do
3: pˆt = ∇It(Llabel + Lshape);
4: pt =
λ
||pˆt||2 · pˆt; . λ is a fixed scale parameter
5: It+1 = clip(It − pt);
6: if PSNR(It) < ε then
7: break
8: t = t+ 1;
9: p = It − I0;
Ensure: adversarial perturbation p
Shape Loss. Shape regression is an important step to refine the bounding box
of object detections or proposals. Specifically, in RPN, shape regression is used
to adjust the anchor boxes to the ground truth bounding boxes of the object by
minimizing the offset between them. Therefore, we design a specific shape loss
to explicitly disturb the bounding box shape regression. Let ∆xj , ∆yj , ∆wj , ∆hj
be the predicted x- and y- coordinate center location offsets, width and height
offset of bounding box bj , respectively. To explicitly disturb the shape regression,
we define a new loss function Lshape as
Lshape(I;Fθ) =
∑m
j=1 zj((∆xj − τx)2 + (∆yj − τy)2 + (∆wj − τw)2 + (∆hj − τh)2),
(3)
where τx, τy, τw, τh are large offsets defined to substitute the real offset between
anchor boxes and matched ground truth bounding boxes. We are only concerned
about the predicted offset of positive proposals, as it is inappropriate to consider
the bounding boxes of negative proposals . By minimizing Eq. (3), the R-AP
method forces predicted offset ∆xj , ∆yj , ∆wj , ∆hj approaching τx, τy, τw, τh re-
spectively, such that the shape of bounding box bj will be incorrect.
3.2 The Robust Adversarial Perturbation (R-AP) Algorithm
To generate the proposed R-AP, we optimize Eq. (1) using an iterative gradient
descent scheme, as mentioned in [9]. Let t denote iteration number. We calculate
the gradient of Llabel + Lshape with respect to image I at t as pˆt. We normalize
pt =
λ
‖pˆt‖2 · pˆt to keep perturbation minimal perceptive and stability of each
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Table 1. Performance of R-AP on 6 state-of-the-art object detectors at mAP 0.5 and
0.7. Lower value denotes better attacking performance.
FR-v16 FR-mn FR-rn50 FR-rn101 FR-rn152 RFCN [12]
origin 59.2/47.3 47.1/32.6 59.5/49.4 63.5/53.6 64.8/54.5 60.1/50.0
random 58.7/46.5 46.5/32.6 59.6/48.9 63.2/53.2 64.6/54.4 59.9/49.6
v16 (p1) 5.1/3.1 34.8/22.2 47.9/36.8 52.7/42.4 55.5/45.0 54.5/43.8
mn (p2) 56.8/44.4 11.0/6.1 56.7/45.2 60.6/50.2 62.3/51.4 57.5/46.6
rn50 (p3) 53.8/41.2 39.5/25.7 10.5/6.6 52.8/42.2 55.9/44.7 53.7/42.6
rn101 (p4) 54.8/42.6 41.0/27.4 50.0/39.2 16.8/11.0 56.0/45.3 52.0/40.4
rn152 (p5) 55.0/41.9 41.8/27.4 49.8/38.3 53.6/42.2 17.3/10.6 54.4/42.9
P = α ·∑5i=1 pi 37.5/25.6 26.4/16.5 31.3/21.3 37.9/27.2 41.4/30.1 47.0/35.9
iteration, where λ is a fixed scale parameter, ‖ · ‖2 is L2 norm metric. Then
image It+1 is updated by It − pt and we clip the pixel value back to [0, 255] at
the end of each iteration. The process is repeated until (1) the maximum iteration
number T is reached, or (2) positive proposals cease to exist, i.e,
∑m
j=1 zj = 0, or
(3) Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is less than a threshold ε. The algorithm
of adversarial perturbation generation is listed in Algorithm 1.
Note that R-AP is not mutually exclusive to other adversarial perturbation
method such as [9] for object detectors. For instance, we can combine R-AP
with method in [9] to generate more effective adversarial perturbations, since
our loss function is based on a different stage of networks compared to other
state-of-the-arts algorithms.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we report the experimental evaluation of R-AP on several state-
of-the-art object detectors and instance segmentation algorithms. Section 4.1
describes the dataset and evaluation metric. Section 4.2 describes the R-AP set-
tings in all experiments. Section 4.3 and section 4.4 presents the R-AP attack
experiments on object detectors and instance segmentation algorithms respec-
tively.
4.1 Dataset
The performance of the R-AP is evaluated on MS COCO 2014 dataset [15], which
is a large scale dataset containing 80 object categories for multiple tasks, includ-
ing object detection and instance segmentation. Experiments are conducted on a
subset (random 3000 images) of the MS COCO 2014 validation set and evaluated
using “mean average precision” (mAP) metric [18] at intersection-over-union
(IoU) threshold 0.5 and 0.7.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of R-AP performance under different PSNR value at mAP 0.5 on
6 object detectors.
4.2 R-AP Settings
We generate adversarial perturbations for five different RPN architectures: vgg16
(v16) [19], mobilenet (mn) [20], resnet50 (rn50), resnet101 (rn101) and resnet152
(rn152) [21], where the adversarial perturbations are denoted p1, p2, p3, p4, p5,
respectively. These RPN architectures are extracted from Faster-RCNN (FR)
object detectors [11] implemented by [22]. We also generate Gaussian noise (ran-
dom) as a perturbation baseline in comparison to demonstrate the effectiveness
of R-AP. Inspired by [9], we accumulate these perturbations as P = α ·∑5i=1 pi,
where α is a scale parameter to control the distortion.
The following parameter values are used throughout the paper: overlap thresh-
old µ1 = 0.1, confidence score threshold µ2 = 0.4, offset τx = τy = τw = τh =
105, scale parameters λ = 30, α = 0.5, and maximum iteration number T = 210.
In general, typical values of PSNR in lossy image compression is between 30 and
50 dB [23]. Therefore, we set ε = 30 dB as the lower bound of PSNR. In our
experiments, all perturbations are terminated at maximum iteration number T
with PSNR > ε.
4.3 Object Detection
We study six state-of-the-art object detectors, including five Faster-RCNN based
methods FR-v16, FR-mn, FR-rn50, FR-rn101, FR-rn152 with various base
networks, and the Region Fully Convolutional Network RFCN [12]. We denote
FR-v16 as vgg16 based Faster-RCNN in short, and the others are named in the
same way accordingly throughout the paper.
Table 1 illustrates the performance of R-AP generated from different RPN
on the six object detectors, where we report mAP metric at 0.5 and 0.7. The 2nd
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row of Table 1 (random) shows the added Gaussian noise as perturbation for a
baseline comparison, and the result shows that the performance degradation is
< 1%. In contrast, the R-AP generated from v16, mn, rn50, rn101, rn152 can
each reduce the performance of the object detectors by a larger amount. Since we
extract v16, mn, rn50, rn101, rn152 based RPN from FR-v16, FR-mn, FR-rn50,
FR-rn101, FR-rn152 detectors respectively, the R-AP works as white-box attack
for their corresponding RPNs. Thus, the degradation for the respective object
detector (highlighted in bold) is significantly larger. For example, the detection
performance of FR-v16 is degraded greatly from 59.2% to 5.1% at mAP 0.5, and
from 47.3% to 3.1% at mAP 0.7.
In comparison, the RFCN works as a black-box detector in our experiment.
Observe that in the RFCN column of Table 1, the R-AP generated from v16, mn,
rn50, rn101, rn152 based RPN can effectively reduce the detection performance.
In particular, the R-AP based on rn101 can reduce the performance from 60.1%
to 52.0% at mAP 0.5, and from 50.0 to 40.4% at mAP 0.7. The last row (P
for RFCN) shows the scaled accumulation of 5 perturbations (p1, p2, p3, p4, p5),
which essentially represents the combination of effects learned from multiple
networks that can notably degrade the performance of RFCN by 13.1% at mAP
0.5 and 14.1% at mAP 0.7.
The performance of R-AP under different PSNR value on six object detec-
tors are shown in Figure 3. Observe that Gaussian noise (random) only produces
small effects as the PSNR decreased. In contrast, the mAP curves of v16, mn,
rn50, rn101, rn152 in respective detector plots drop significantly compared to
others. The black curve in each plot is the performance of accumulated pertur-
bation P . We can see in pure black-box object detector RFCN, the accumulated
perturbation curve drops notably and achieves the best results.
We illustrate the visual performance of accumulated P on several object
detectors in the first four rows of Figure 5. Due to the degradation of RPN after
R-AP attack, the person in FR-rn50 (b) is not detected. For the case of FR-mn
(d), despite the target is correctly identified, the bounding box is disturbed to
an undesired shape.
4.4 Instance Segmentation
We evaluate the proposed R-AP on attacking two of the state-of-the-art instance
segmentation methods in a black-box setting — FCIS [13] and Mask-RCNN
(MR) [14]. Table 2 summarizes the performance degradation after applying R-
AP at mAP 0.5 and 0.7. The 2nd row of the table (random) shows a baseline by
adding simple Gaussian noise as the perturbation, which is known to be ineffec-
tive in attacking, i.e. with only < 1% performance decreased. In contrast, R-AP
based on v16, mn, rn50, rn101, rn152 each leads to large degradation of the
performance. In particular, R-AP based on rn101 degrades the performance of
FCIS by 10.2% at mAP 0.5 and 9.8% at mAP 0.7, and reduces MR performance
by 9.3% at mAP 0.5 and 7.8% at mAP 0.7. Notably, the accumulated perturba-
tion P degrades the performance of both methods — a decrease of 15.1%/13.2%
on FCIS and 16.7%/13.8% on MR.
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Table 2. Performance of black-box attack on 2 state-of-the-art instance segmentation
algorithms at mAP 0.5 and 0.7. Lower value denotes better attacking performance.
FCIS [13] MR [14]
origin 61.0/45.8 60.3/45.6
random 60.4/45.6 59.4/45.0
v16 (p1) 54.7/40.0 51.3/38.1
mn (p2) 57.6/42.4 55.5/41.9
rn50 (p3) 52.8/38.2 52.0/38.1
rn101 (p4) 50.8/36.1 51.0/37.8
rn152 (p5) 53.4/39.1 51.9/38.8
P = α ·∑5i=1 pi 45.9/32.6 43.6/31.8
Fig. 4. Illustration of R-AP performance under different PSNR value at mAP 0.5 on
2 instance segmentation algorithms.
Figure 4 shows the performance evaluation of the R-AP black-box attack un-
der different PSNR on the two instance segmentation methods. The blue curve
corresponding to Gaussian noise is mostly flat, which shows the inefficacy of at-
tack. In contrast, R-AP is effective for both instance segmentation methods. No-
tably, the black curve corresponding to the accumulated perturbation P achieves
the largest degredation among all.
Visual illustration of the accumulated P attack for instance segmentation is
shown in the last two rows in Figure 5. Observe that the object instances are
poorly segmented after the R-AP perturbation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a robust adversarial perturbation (R-AP) method
to attack deep proposal-based object detectors and instance segmentation al-
gorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to investigate
the universal adversarial attack of the deep proposal-based models. Our method
focuses on attacking Region Proposal Network (RPN), a component used in
most deep proposal-based models, to universally affect the performance of their
respective tasks. We describe a new loss function to not only disturb label pre-
diction but also degrade shape regression. Evaluations on the MS COCO 2014
Robust Adversarial Perturbation on Deep Proposal-based Models 11
F
R
­
v
1
6
F
R
­
m
n
F
R
­
r
n
5
0
F
C
I
S
R
F
C
N
M
R
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 5. Visual results of the R-AP attack on several mainstream object detectors (first
4 rows) and instance segmentation algorithms (last 2 rows). Columns (a,c) are the
original results, and (b,d) are the R-AP attacked results.
dataset shows that the R-AP can effectively attack several state-of-the-art object
detectors and instance segmentation algorithms.
Future work includes conducting further experiments on additional deep
proposal-based models, including the part-based human pose detection. This
work also opens up new opportunities on how to effectively improve the robust-
ness of RPN-based networks.
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